|Figure 1. Initial state of the segregation model. On average, every square has 50% "same" neighbors, and every individual square would like to have 30% neighbors who are like them. Those marked with a cross have less and are thus "unhappy".|
Figure 2. End state of the segregation model with an initial 30% same preference.
|Figure 3. One possible end state with a minimum of 20% same and 20% different neighbors.|
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